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Abstract
We propose an approach to distinguish between
correct and incorrect image classifications. Our
approach can detect misclassifications which ei-
ther occur unintentionally (“natural errors”), or
due to intentional adversarial attacks (“adversar-
ial errors”), both in a single unified framework.
Our approach is based on the observation that
correctly classified images tend to exhibit robust
and consistent classifications under certain image
transformations (e.g., horizontal flip, small image
translation, etc.). In contrast, incorrectly classified
images (whether due to adversarial errors or natu-
ral errors) tend to exhibit large variations in clas-
sification results under such transformations. Our
approach does not require any modifications or
retraining of the classifier, hence can be applied to
any pre-trained classifier. We further use state of
the art targeted adversarial attacks to demonstrate
that even when the adversary has full knowledge
of our method, the adversarial distortion needed
for bypassing our detector is no longer impercep-
tible to the human eye. Our approach obtains
state-of-the-art results compared to previous ad-
versarial detection methods, surpassing them by a
large margin.
1. Introduction
Despite recent progress, state of the art recognition methods
still have non-negligible error rates. For instance, typical
top-5 error rate of modern classifiers on ImageNet is on the
order of 4-5% (Szegedy et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2017). As
deep learning methods become incorporated into sensitive
applications in medical, transportation, and security do-
mains, dealing with remaining recognition errors becomes
1Department of Applied Math & Computer Science, Weiz-
mann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel 2Part of this work was
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Figure 1. Invariance to image transformations as a proxy to
classification’s reliability. From left to right in each row: input
images, their horizontally flipped version and their (color-coded)
softmax outputs corresponding to top 4 input image softmax values
(using a pre-trained ResNet inception V2 classifier). Softmax
values of the misclassified images (b and c) fluctuate across image
versions, while those of the correctly classified image (a) are
stable. Corresponding KL-divergence scores between softmax
distributions (along with implied detection decision) indicated
above each distribution allow to distinguish between correct and
erroneous classifications.
critical. The concern is aggravated by the discovery of
adversarial attacks on CNN-based recognizers, whereby
errors in CNNs can be triggered on demand (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017b). Such attacks have been shown to be ca-
pable of reducing accuracy of classifiers to arbitrarily low
levels. Alarmingly, while images resulting from these at-
tacks manage to fool state of the art classifiers, they appear
indistinguishable, to the naked eye, from “normal” images
classified correctly.
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Traditionally, such adversarial errors and unintentional er-
rors (“natural errors”) have been treated as two separate
problems. The former have motivated a sequence of defense
mechanisms, each in turn defeated by subsequent modifica-
tion of the attacks. The natural errors are simply considered
a fact of life, and the main avenue to deal with them has
been to improve classifier acurracy.
Adversarial errors Adversarial attacks are usually catego-
rized as black box, when the attacker has no knowledge
of the classifier parameters (weights), and white box, in
which the attacker has full knowledge of the classifier. We
use additional terminology to describe the level of knowl-
edge the (white box) attacker has on the error detector itself:
“known detector” (KD) attackers have full knowledge of
both the classifier and the detector, while “unknown de-
tector” (UD) attackers know only the classifier, and do not
have any knowledge of the detector.
Additionally, one can characterize the “strength” of an attack
by the degree of distortion it applies to the original image in
order to “fool” the classifier (and the detector, if relevant).
The higher the distortion the more perceptible it becomes,
making it less likely to go unnoticed by a human, thus
forming a weaker (and arguably less interesting) attack.
The rapidly expanding literature on the topic follows a
“cat and mouse” competition between attacks and detec-
tion/defense. Almost all of the recently proposed detection
methods have been evaluated in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a),
who used their strong C&W attack (proposed in 2017) to
attack MNIST and CIFAR-10 classifiers. They found most
methods exhibit good detection performance under the UD
scenario but are easily defeated in the KD case. They fur-
ther pointed out the weakness of using (deep) learning to
construct adversarial error detectors as in (Gong et al., 2017;
Grosse et al., 2017; Metzen et al., 2017)): “the least ef-
fective schemes used another neural network [. . . since. . . ]
given that adversarial examples can fool a single classifier,
it makes sense that adversarial examples can fool a classi-
fier and detector.” Other bypassed methods applied PCA
on the images or network activations (Bhagoji et al., 2017;
Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016; Li & Li, 2017), or employed
other statistical tests (Feinman et al., 2017; Grosse et al.,
2017).
Only the Dropout method of (Feinman et al., 2017) forced
the attacker to use a somewhat perceptible image distortion
in order to bypass the detection, and only for the MNIST
case. In the CIFAR10 case it was bypassed with an imper-
ceptible distortion.
Natural error detection The dropout method was also
applied in earlier work for natural error detection (Man-
delbaum & Weinshall, 2017). An even simpler ap-
proach (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) suggests to threshold
the Maximal Softmax Response (MSR) in order to detect
natural errors.
We propose a unified framework to detect classification er-
rors, whether natural or adversarial. The key idea in our
approach stems from our observation that robustness of clas-
sifiers’ outputs under certain simple image transformations
(e.g. horizontal flip) is systematically different for cases of
correct classification vs. cases of misclassification. This
idea is schematically illustrated in Fig. 1.
We measure the KL-divergence between the outputs of the
classifier under image transformations. Fig. 2 presents ex-
amples and histograms of this divergence score 퐷퐾퐿 for
the cases of correct, naturally incorrect and maliciously
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. Ability to distinguish between correctly & incor-
rectly classified images. (a) Examples of correctly classified
(green), adversarially misclassified (blue) and naturally misclassi-
fied (red) ImageNet images. Corresponding detection scores 퐷퐾퐿
and predicted classes (using ResNet Inception V2) appear below
each image. (b) Histograms (left) and zoom-in on lower left region
(right) of 퐷퐾퐿 scores corresponding to 5,000 ImageNet test-set
images (uniformly sampled across all classes). Separation between
the different (color-coded) cases confirms the competence of the
simple 퐷퐾퐿 score (calculated here using the horizontal flip trans-
formation), especially for separating adversarial images (blue)
from natural ones (red & green).
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incorrect image classifications. It shows we can use this di-
vergence score 퐷퐾퐿 to detect classification errors, whether
natural or adversarial (see details in Sec. 2). This detection
score can then provide a robust reject option for classifiers,
and a degree of defense against adversarial attacks.
We show that our detector is hard for an adversary to defeat,
even when the adversary has full knowledge of the detec-
tor’s process. We conjecture that this is partially due to the
detector’s simplicity. For natural errors detection alone, we
further propose to incorporate a learned Multi Layer Percep-
tron (MLP) for enhanced detection performance, as we can
afford to use a more sophisticated detector in that case.
Our proposed method is computationally inexpensive, and
only requires access to the inputs and outputs of the given
classifier. In contrast, the dropout method requires full
control of the classifier weights at test time, and tends to be
more computationally expensive (as they run each image 50
or 30 times through the classifier). Our method makes use of
the entire posterior distribution given by the classifier, that
was shown to contain information valuable in the decision
making process, termed “dark knowledge” in (Hinton et al.,
2015). This is in contrast to the MSR method, that only uses
the maximal posterior value.
In our evaluation, we employ some of the strongest adver-
sarial attack methods available, like the one by Carlini &
Wagner (2017b) (C&W) and the Projected Gradient De-
scend (PGD) attack by (Madry et al., 2017). We evaluate
using both targeted attacks, where the adversary intends to
change the predicted label to a specific wrong class, and
untargeted attacks, where predicting any wrong label will
satisfy the adversary.
We demonstrate State Of The Art (SOTA) error detection
performance in our experiments (Sec. 4). We further show
that even when the adversary has full knowledge of our
method (the KD threat model), the adversarial distortion
needed for bypassing our detector is no longer imperceptible
to the human eye.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose a unified framework for detecting classif-
cation errors (whether natural or adversarial).
2. We introduce a mechanism for inferring confidence in
the classification of an image from its robustness under
image transformations.
3. Our detector’s performance significantly improves over
previous SOTA methods for detecting natural and ad-
versarial errors (both targeted and untargeted).
4. We show that, unlike any previous method, SOTA tar-
geted attacks, even with full knowledge of the detector,
are forced to use perceptible distortion in order to by-
pass detection.
5. Our method can be applied to any pre-trained classifier,
without any modifications or retraining. We demon-
strate its superior performance, even when applied to
classifiers that were fine-tuned to improve performance
of competing natural error detection methods.
We will make our code available soon.
2. Detecting Classification Errors
A common goal in building visual classifiers is that classifi-
cation output be robust under certain image transformations
applied to the image. We observe that while this is generally
the case for correctly classified images, this tends not to be
true for misclassified ones. This relationship between the
correctness of a prediction and its invariance under image
transformations is the key to our approach.
We will restrict our attention to image transformations that
can be expected to occur naturally in realistic imaging con-
ditions, without affecting the content of the image. While
we cannot provide a principled definition of the space of
all such "natural" transformations, we can recognize such
transformations intuitively. For instance, horizontal (left to
right) flip is natural due to lateral symmetries in the world;
zooming into the image is natural since it corresponds to
bringing the camera closer to the scene; etc.
Notation An 푁-way classifier 퐹 computes for an
input 푥 an 푁-dimensional vector of class logits
퐙(푥) ≜ [푍1(푥),… , 푍푁 (푥)]. Using the softmax transfor-
mation, the logits can be converted to estimated posterior
distribution over classes 퐹 (푥):
퐹푐(푥) =
exp푍푐 (푥)∕푇∑
푐∈[푁] exp푍푐 (푥)∕푇
, (1)
where 퐹푐(푥) is the estimated conditional probability of
푐 ∈ [푁] being the class of 푥. 푇 is a temperature parameter
(default is 푇 = 1) affecting the resulting distribution’s en-
tropy, that rises with 푇 (approaching uniform distribution
as 푇 → ∞, and a delta function when 푇 → 0).
A classifier prediction is made by selecting 푐̂(푥) =
argmax
푐
퐹푐(푥). This is an error on example 푥 with label 푦 if
푐̂(푥) ≠ 푦.
Given an image transformation 푡, we can assess the degree
of invariance of the classifier’s output under this transfor-
mation as the difference between two distributions, 퐹 (푥)
and 퐹 (푡(푥)). As an illustration, Fig. 1 presents three images,
along with their transformed (푡=horizontal flip) versions.
The right hand side shows the corresponding softmax out-
puts for both image versions. Note that for the correctly
classified image (top row) the output is consistent across
image versions, while for the misclassified ones (middle
and bottom rows) the transformation induces significant
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changes in the classifier’s output. It is immaterial for this
figure which class indices in the plots correspond to the
correct classes; what we are looking for is the difference
between the 퐹 (푥) (black) and 퐹 (푡(푥)) (blue).
We convert this intuition into a concrete error de-
tector by measuring the Kullback-Leibler Divergence1
(퐷퐾퐿) (Kullback, 1959) between the two softmax out-
puts 퐷퐾퐿 (퐹 (푥)||퐹 (푡(푥))) as a detection score. Figure 2b
presents histograms of 퐷퐾퐿 scores (for 푡 = hor. flip) corre-
sponding to three types of classifications: correct (green),
naturally incorrect (red) and adversarially incorrect (blue)
classifications of ImageNet images. Adversarial images
were created using the strong C&W targeted attack on a pre-
trained Inception ResNet V2 classifier (Szegedy et al., 2016).
Note that퐷퐾퐿 scores exhibit fairly good separation between
adversarially (blue) and naturally (red) misclassified images,
and even better separation between adversarially misclassi-
fied and correctly classified (green) images.
The higher 퐷퐾퐿 is, the less stable the output of 퐹 is on 푥
under transformation 푡, and so, the less confident we are that
퐹 (푥) is correct. A binary error detector is obtained by
introducing a threshold 휏: if 퐷퐾퐿 (퐹 (푥)||퐹 (푡(푥))) > 휏,
reject 푥 as a misclassified image.
In Section 4 we report on our evaluation of this simple al-
gorithm on the tasks of detecting targeted and untargeted
adversarial images, generated by state of the art attack meth-
ods. We found our approach to outperform previous adver-
sarial detection methods by a large margin. Moreover, for
the case of targeted “known detector” (KD) threat model,
we found that it forcest the attacker to induce a very high
and visible image distortion in order to bypass our detector.
We note that image transformations have also been explored
as a defense mechanism by (Guo et al., 2018), but in a to-
tally different way. In particular, they did not explore the
divergence between classifier outputs under different trans-
formations. In a recent work, Tian et al. (2018) proposed
to exploit the sensitivity of classification to image trans-
formations for adversarial detection. But unlike our work
their detection relies on a trained neural network, which
can be easily bypassed in an KD scenario (Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017a). Moreover, they only demonstrate their method
against targeted attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10 (and only
for a single threshold setting).
3. Improving Natural Error Detection
The simplicity of퐷퐾퐿 score is a virtue from a security stand-
point, since the lack of a complex parametric mechanism
1Other distance measures between distributions, including
Jensen-Shannon divergence, squared distance, or Kolmogorov-
Smirnov divergence, may be used; like 퐷퐾퐿 they exploit the “dark
knowledge” (Hinton et al., 2015), and exhibit similar behavior.
makes it harder for an adversary to circumvent it (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017a) in the worst case KD scenario. This
is indeed supported by our experiments (Sec. 4) and by
Fig. 2b: It indicates that the 퐷퐾퐿 score, based on a single
transformation, suffices for detecting adversarial images.
However, Fig. 2b also implies 퐷퐾퐿 is less effective in
separating natural errors (red) from correct classifications
(green). This is partially due to the coarse binning hiding
finer separation for very low values of 퐷퐾퐿, but our experi-
ments confirm that the separation is indeed less significant
than for adversarial images. However, if we restrict our
attention to natural errors, we can afford to employ a more
complex detection mechanism to enhance detection perfor-
mance (since there is no adversary to exploit “loopholes”
in it). Below we propose such a mechanism that captures
the rich information contained in logits corresponding to
different transformations. Here we consider a set of image
transformation {푡1,… , 푡푚} rather than just one.
We create a new representation for 푥 that reflects the in-
variance of 퐹 under these transformations, as follows (illus-
trated in Figure 3). Recall that Z(푥) is the vector of logit
values computed by 퐹 on 푥.
1. We jointly reorder logits vectors corresponding to the
transformed image versions {퐙(푡푗(푥))}푚푡=1. The sorted
logit order is the same for all transformed versions of
the input image, and is determined by the sorting (in
descending order) of the logit values of the original
input, 퐙(푥). This makes the representation independent
of the predicted class 푐̂(푥푖).
2. We truncate each reordered logits vector to 푁 ′ ≤ 푁 el-
ements. We empirically found it reduces the detector’s
overfitting.
3. We concatenate the reordered, truncated vectors into a
single vector of length (푚 + 1) ⋅푁 ′.
We then use a binary Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) to pre-
dict the probability of the classification 퐹 (푥) being incorrect.
To train it, we collect a set of category-labeled examples
(푥푖, 푦푖) (ideally from a heldout set outside of 퐹 ’s training
data), and for each 푥푖 compute the logits vectors correspond-
ing to the original input 퐙(푥푖) and its transformed versions
{퐙(푡푗(푥푖))}푚푡=1. These logits constitute the MLP’s input. We
then assign this input with its corresponding error label 푒푖,
set to 1 if 푦푖 ≠ 퐹 (푥푖) and -1 otherwise. See Section 4 for
details on architecture and training of the MLP.
Note that in a scenario involving both natural and adversarial
images, we could theoretically start by rejecting adversarial
images using our simple 퐷퐾퐿-based mechanism. Then,
assuming our detector is no longer susceptible to adversarial
attacks, we could proceed to use this logits-based MLP
for enhanced natural error detection. However, this mode
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Figure 3. Overview of (optional) learned detector. Given an im-
age 푥 and a pre-trained classifier 퐹 , we feed 푥 and several (three,
in this example) natural transformations of it into 퐹 . We jointly
re-order all resulting logits vectors so that the logits vector for 푥
(the original image) is in descending order, then truncate the logits
vectors to retain only the 푁 ′ first logits and finally concatenate
them to yield the input to our detector.
of operation may introduce additional vulnerabilities, for
instance adversary fooling the MLP detector into rejecting
correctly classified images as erroneous.
Relation to data augmentation Image transformations are
commonly employed for augmenting the training set of a
classifier. This may raise a question: how can we benefit
from invariance to a transformation if the classifier, ostensi-
bly, is trained to be invariant to it? A key observation here is
that data augmentation does not necessarily force the classi-
fier to learn invariance to transformations of a given image -
the classifier may simply learn that the different transformed
versions correspond to different instantiations of the same
class, encouraging each one separately to output the cor-
rect class. In contrast, our method infers confidence in a
prediction from actual invariance of classifiers’ outputs on
transformed versions of an image. In fact, results in Fig. 2b
were obtained using the horizontal flip transformation, for
classifiers that included horizontal flip in their data augmen-
tation procedure during training. Moreover, comparing our
method’s performance on two CIFAR10 classifiers trained
with vs. without horizontal flip augmentation showed no
meaningful difference in our ability to reject errors. This
suggests our method’s performance is independent of the
classifier’s training data augmentation procedure.
4. Experiments
We evaluate our error detection method using four data-sets:
CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009), STL-10 (Coates
et al., 2011), CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009), and
ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015), which vary in terms
of both number of examples and the number of classes. This
is to confirm that the proposed method generalizes across
task sizes. We demonstrate results with different classifiers,
including CIFAR10 classifiers from (Carlini & Wagner,
2017b) and (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), classifiers trained
by (Mandelbaum & Weinshall, 2017) and the competitive
Inception-ResNet-V2 classifier (Szegedy et al., 2016).
We employ the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve and the corresponding Area Under ROC Curve (AU-
ROC) to allow thorough evaluation of various detection
policies (e.g. low mis-detection, low false-detection).
Figure 4. “Unknown detector” (UD) threat model. ROC curves
corresponding to detecting targeted (solid line) and untargeted
(dashed line) C&W attacks on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015)
images (using the same classifier as in Fig. 2b). The L2 norms
in the legend indicate the average (per pixel) norm of the per-
turbation produced by the attacker; pixels are in [0,255] range.
Values in legend correspond to the AUROC (Area Under ROC) of
the different methods. We use our method (red) with 푡 =hor. flip
and compare it to the dropout (blue) and MSR (green) methods.
Increasing the attack’s confidence parameter from 푘 = 0 (left) to
푘 = 8 (right) hardly affects the adversarial noise norm (퐿2 in the
legends), but significantly impairs performance of both compet-
ing methods. In contrast, our method still achieves AUROC≈1,
indicating nearly perfect detection.
4.1. Adversarial image detection
We follow the framework put forth by (Carlini & Wagner,
2017a) which was able to bypass ten adversarial detection
methods, and evaluate our detector using their attack (Car-
lini & Wagner, 2017b) (C&W)2 under the two different
threat models, “Unknown Detector” (UD) and “Known
Detector” (KD). We compare our method to the simple
Maximal Softmax Response (MSR) method (Hendrycks &
Gimpel, 2016) and to the dropout method (Feinman et al.,
2017), that was found to be the most effective by (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017a). The methods are compared on 10,000
CIFAR-10 validation set images and on 5,000 images sam-
pled from ImageNet validation set.
4.1.1. “UNKNOWN DETECTOR” (UD) PERFORMANCE
Figure 4 shows ROC curves and their corresponding Area
Under ROC values (“AUROC”) on the task of detecting
adversarial images. The reported results are on ImageNet,
2We further experimented with the PGD attack (Madry et al.,
2017). but omit these experimental details, as we found PGD to
be a much weaker attack (compared to C&W), easily detected or
prevented by our method in both KD and UD scenarios. We hence
focus on our experiments with the more challenging C&W attack.
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using a horizontal flip transformation.
We run both targeted and untargeted attacks (in the targeted
case we randomly assign target labels). We find our method
ranks best in all comparisons, nearing perfect detection
capabilities (AUROC≈ 1).
The C&W attack employed in these experiment has a tun-
able parameter “confidence” 푘 that determines how confi-
dently should classifier 퐹 misclassify the resulting adversar-
ial image. Higher values lead to more confidently misclas-
sified examples with better transferability across classifiers
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017b), at the cost of increased image
distortion (quantified here using the 퐿2 norm). The experi-
ments in Fig. 4 were conducted using either the minimum
attack confidence value 푘 = 0 (left) or a slightly higher one,
푘 = 8 (right). Note that despite the imperceptible increase
in image distortion, the advantage of our method becomes
even clearer in the higher confidence case (right). We see
the same phenomenon on CIFAR10 (using the classifier
from (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a)). Fig. 5 depicts the result-
ing AUROC vs. average image distortion norm (controlled
indirectly by varying confidence 푘 of the attacker) for the
targeted (left) and untargeted (right) attacks. It shows our
method can detect highly confident, transferable, adversarial
images well after the competing methods drop to chance
level accuracy (AUROC around or below 0.5).
Figure 5. Detection performance vs. adversarial distortion. In-
creasing the C&W attack’s confidence parameter 푘 results in more
confidently misclassified images with increased transferability,
while increasing image distortion. Unlike for our method (red),
detection performance (AUROC) on CIFAR10 images drop dras-
tically for the dropout (Feinman et al., 2017) (blue) and MSR
(Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) (green) methods as 푘 (and adver-
sarial distortion) increase, in both targeted (left) and untargeted
(right) UD attacks.
Finally, in Tab. 1 we examine the effect of transformation
choice 푡 on performance. We tested the ability to detect
untargeted C&W attacks using the horizontal flip, Gamma
correction and zoom-in transformations, and found they
all yield excellent detection performance, often close to
perfect (AUROC close to 1). We further experimented with
averaging or taking the maximal 퐷퐾퐿 score over several
transformations, and found it yields similar performance to
that using individual transformations.
Table 1. Detecting UD attacks using different transformations.
AUROC values reflect detection performance for untargeted UD
C&W attacks (with 푘 = 0) on the ResNet Inception V2 ImageNet
classifier and the CIFAR-10 classifiers from (Carlini & Wagner,
2017a) (“ResNet32”) and (Papernot et al., 2016) (“basic”).
CIFAR-10
(basic)
CIFAR-10
(ResNet32)
ImageNet
(top 5)
Hor. flip 0.936 0.976 0.966
Gamma0.6 0.906 0.954 0.941
Zoom×1.05 0.932 0.974 0.964
4.1.2. “KNOWN DETECTOR” (KD) PERFORMANCE
We next present experiments with the KD threat model,
where an adversary attempts to simultaneously deceive the
classifier and bypass the detection mechanism. It should be
noted that any detection method can eventually be bypassed,
since the attacker could simply replace an image with an
alternative natural image from another class, thus achiev-
ing desired “wrong” classification. However, such trivial
“attacks” are easily visible to a human observer, whereas
imperceptible attackes are both more powerful and more
interesting from the perspective of understanding vulnera-
bilities of current visual recognition.
We show that to overcome our detector even with moderate
level of success, the attacker needs to modify the original
image to a degree that is perceptible to the human eye, in
contrast to the much lower distortion imposed by previously
proposed detection methods. To this end, we employ the
commonly used 퐿2 and 퐿∞ norms (measuring the squared
change averaged over pixels, and maximal change over pix-
els, respectively) to quantify this distortion, and conduct our
experiments using a targeted C&W attack (Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017b) that explicitly minimizes this 퐿2 norm while
manipulating images.
The AUROC curves in Fig. 5 show that attacking with higher
confidence parameter 푘 > 0 is enough to deceive both
the dropout (Feinman et al., 2017) and MSR (Hendrycks
& Gimpel, 2016) methods, while imposing imperceptible
distortion. However, this approach is clearly ineffective
against our method, that requires much higher, perceptible,
distortion in order to be breached.
To make the attack more credible, we adopted the following
successful approach from (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) as our
KD attack: We define a new function 퐺(푥) that represents
the combination of a given푁 classes classifier 퐹 with logits
{푍(푥)푖}푁푖=1, and our detectors’ output score,퐷퐾퐿(푥). 퐺 is a
classifier with 푁 +1 classes. It classifies image 푥 according
to 퐹 (i.e. as belonging to one of the 푁 classes) whenever
our detection score is below a pre-defined detection thresh-
old 휏, and classifies 푥 as an “adversarial” (class 푁 + 1)
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otherwise. We can then simulate the KD threat model by
running a targeted C&W attack on 퐺 instead of 퐹 , produc-
ing images that manage to fool classifier 퐹 , while keeping
clear of the error detector threshold 퐷퐾퐿(푥) < 휏. We use 휏
corresponding to 1% false detection rate (FPR) throughout
our experiments.
Table 2. “Known detector” (KD) threat model, targeted at-
tacks (ImageNet). From left to right: Detector configuration,
bypassing rate corresponding to 1% FPR and average imposed 퐿2
and 퐿∞ norms (using a 0-255 scale). Comparing the UD attack
(row 0) with KD attacks using several transformations with temper-
ature 푇 = 1 (rows 1-3) vs. 푇 ≈ 0.15 (rows 4-6). Distortion norms
computed over 250 ImageNet images. We denote zoom-in times
1.03 by ‘zoom’ and image translation of 푥, 푦 (in the corresponding
axes) by ‘shift푥,푦’.
Configuration
Bypass
@1%FPR || ⋅ ||2 || ⋅ ||∞
(0) UD: 푡 = hor. flip 2% 0.75 12.39
(1) 푡 = zoom 97% 1.71 20.15
(2) 푡 = hor. flip 100% 1.64 18.48
(3) 푡 = shift 1
2 ,
1
2
93% 1.2 16.32
(4) 푡 = zoom, 푇 = 0.16 55% 6.84 47.5
(5) 푡 = hor. flip, 푇 = 0.12 53% 7.54 51.45
(6) 푡 = shift 1
2 ,
1
2
, 푇 = 0.15 84% 4.17 31.79
We find the temperature 푇 in Eq. (1) to have a dramatic
effect on the detection performance. Setting 푇 = 1 (rows
1-3 in Tab. 2) allows the attack to evade detection in almost
100% of images while imposing only slight, imperceptible,
increase in distortion. However, lowering the softmax tem-
perature parameter 푇 (Eq. 1) dramatically increased our
method’s robustness. Rows 4-6 corresponding to 푇 ≈ 0.15
show that our method prevents almost half the adversar-
ial attacks, and requires an order-of-magnitude increase in
average distortion (row 5) of those images that do bypass
it successfully, compared to the UD attack (row 0). This
degree of distortion is no longer imperceptible to the naked
eye, as exemplified in Fig. 6. We emphasize again that
in these KD experiments, the attacker has access to full
information about the detector, including the value of 푇 .
To understand the effect of the temperature parameter 푇 in
Eq. 1, recall that in the KD scenario the adversary attacks
the combined classifier-detector model 퐺. This means the
adversary creates images that simultaneously manage to de-
ceive the classifier, 퐹 (푥) ≠ 푦, and maintain small distance
(measured using 퐷퐾퐿) between the outputs corresponding
to the original and transformed images, 퐹 (푥) and 퐹 (푡(푥)),
respectively. Setting lower 푇 focuses this distance compu-
tation on the few top ranking classes, rather than evenly
weighing the entire softmax distribution. This makes the
Figure 6. Our detector forces large, perceptible perturbations
in adversarial images. “Known detector” attack; Original im-
ages (top) and their successfully deceiving manipulated versions
(middle). Bypassing our detector (with 푡 = hor. flip, 푇 = 0.12)
under the challenging KD threat model requires significant image
distortion, that is easily noticeable by the naked eye – see slightly
zoomed in regions for emphasis (bottom). Class prediction and
distortion norms reported below each image.
adversary’s task considerably more difficult.
We have also experimented with untargeted KD attacks
(an easier task for the attacker, with much more flexibility).
Here too we observed the detector forcing higher pertur-
bations in the images to bypass the detector, but not ris-
ing to the level easily perceptible to humans (퐿2 = 1.4,
퐿∞ = 19.5). However ImageNet has many closely related
classes, e.g., similar breeds of dogs. This high inter-class
similarity renders untargeted attacks in this domain some-
what less interesting.
4.2. Natural error detection
We next evaluate the enhanced natural error detection per-
formance. Our detector is a fully connected network with
two hidden layers of width 30, each followed by RELU
nonlinearity, and a batch normalization layer. We train it
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Table 3. Detecting natural errors. Comparing detection perfor-
mance (AUROC) of our method with the MSR, dropout and SOTA
DBC methods. We detect using either hor. flip based 퐷퐾퐿 score
or an MLP (based on the hor. flip, Gamma correction, contrast
modification, gray-scale conversion and small horizontal blur
transformations). Performance is compared using classifiers pre-
trained by the DBC work, using either solely cross entropy loss
(Regular) or its combination with an adversarial loss term (AT),
for their improved performance.
STL-10 CIFAR-100
Regular AT Regular AT
MSR 0.806 0.813 0.834 0.842
Dropout 0.803 0.809 0.834 0.847
DBC 0.786 0.866 0.782 0.858
퐷퐾퐿 (Ours) 0.814 0.801 0.835 0.825
MLP (Ours) 0.846 0.868 0.864 0.869
using asymmetric cross-entropy loss (reweighting examples
to correct for the imbalance in number of correct vs. er-
ror training examples) and dropout probability 0.5 in both
hidden layers.
For training it, we use images from the original validation-
set, by splitting it into training and validation subsets for our
detector.3 When performing the pre-processing (described
in Sec. 2) for the STL-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet clas-
sifiers, we truncate each input logits vector and leave only
the top 푁 ′ = 5∕10∕20 ranked classes of the input image,
respectively.
We augment our detector’s training set by randomly ap-
plying horizontal flip and random brightness and contrast
adjustments (and for ImageNet also random cropping). This
data augmentation pipeline is performed before applying
our (fixed) transformations 푡.
We evaluate our method on the STL-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets, and compare it to MSR (Hendrycks & Gimpel,
2016), dropout (Feinman et al., 2017) and the SOTA Dis-
tance Based Confidence (DBC) method by Mandelbaum and
Weinshall (2017). DBC detects natural errors by accessing
the classifier’s internal activations.
Table 3 present Area Under ROC (AUROC) values obtained
using two types of pre-trained classifiers of (Mandelbaum &
Weinshall, 2017). These two types differ in the loss function
utilized for their training: The Regular classifier used only
the cross entropy loss. The AT classifier was fine-tuned
using the adversarial loss term of (Goodfellow et al., 2014)4,
3We avoid training our MLP on images that were used for the
classifiers’ training, to avoid train/test disparity since the classifier
had a chance to optimize its output on the training images. In-
stead we train the detector on a subset of the validation set. The
subset assignment for each data-set is consistent across all our
experiments, and will be made public, along with our code.
4Another comparison on a third loss term proposed in (Mandel-
that was found to improve the performance of DBC.
Using our basic 퐷퐾퐿 score yields favorable performance
on the regular classifiers. However, using our MLP detector
achieves the best performance on all classifiers and datasets.
Note that while our detector can be used on any given, pre-
trained, classifier, it achieves SOTA performance even on
classifiers that were modified by the DBC method in its
favor (the AT configuration).
ImageNet Finally, we evaluated our natural error detection
performance (with and without using an MLP) when applied
to the ILSVRC-2012 ImageNet classification task. We used
a pre-trained Inception-ResNet-v2 model (Szegedy et al.,
2016) that achieves 81% and 95.5% top-1 and top-5 accura-
cies, respectively. As before, we used part of ImageNet’s
validation set to train our detector (20% in this experiment),
and evaluated its performance on the remaining part. Ta-
ble 4 compares AUROC values corresponding to ours and
the MSR (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) methods. Due to
the scale of ImageNet, we did not compare to methods
that require either extensive re-training (DBC) or extensive
computation (dropout).
Table 4. Detecting natural errors on ImageNet. Comparing de-
tection performance (AUROC) of our method using either 퐷퐾퐿
score or an MLP (both based on the same transformations as in
Tab. 3), with the MSR method. Tested on a pre-trained Inception-
ResNet-V2 classifier.
Top-1 Top-5
MSR 0.842 0.806
퐷퐾퐿 (Ours) 0.852 0.823
MLP (Ours) 0.875 0.884
5. Conclusions
We devise a simple & robust classification error detector
based on our observation that incorrect predictions corre-
spond to less stable classifier outputs under a set of image
transformations. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this
approach for rejecting adversarial examples, under a variety
of attack scenarios, including the most challenging Known
Detector (KD) attack by the Carlini & Wagner method. We
further propose to enhance detection of natural errors by
training an invariance based MLP. Beyond the immediate
applications to increase robustness and reduce classifiers’
vulnerability, the success of our detection methods suggests
further study of invariance of convolutional networks under
image transformations, and the potential role this invariance
may play in improving recognition.
baum & Weinshall, 2017) yielded similar results, omitted here for
lack of space. When using their classifier, we follow (Mandelbaum
& Weinshall, 2017) and pre-process the original and transformed
images by global contrast minimization and ZCA whitening.
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